DescriptionEpistemic injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in social and feminist epistemology, and has contributed to reviving interest in issues in the intersections between epistemology andethics/political philosophy. Much of the impetus for this recent explosion of interest has been the influential work of Miranda Fricker; however, Fricker’s framework and terminology for discussing the phenomena and examples she’s interested in have not always been cleanly separated from the phenomena themselves. This talk examines what’s distinctive of Fricker’s treatment of the phenomena she labels epistemic injustice, focusing on the two varieties that her discussion highlights: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Once the distinctive elements of Fricker’s treatment are clearer, we will be better placed to assess which of them are plausible and which implausible, and to consider alternative theoretical frameworks for thinking about the phenomena, such as that developed by Kristie Dotson.
|7 Dec 2022
|3rd Annual Political Epistemology Conference