Description
There is growing interest in the philosophy of science in scientific pluralism, which claims that there are important epistemic goods to be had from maintaining multiple lines of inquiry in scientific projects. One strand of this – Perspectival Realism – develops this idea by arguing that contributions from communities traditionally viewed as ‘non-scientific’ to scientific research is essential for producing reliable knowledge.This talk examines the replication crisis in psychology through the lens of perspectival realism, using case studies of infants’ understanding of psychological states. It will argue that one reason for the difficulties in replicating this work is that it is distinctly monothematic in its approach, and does not involve voices from outwith academic psychology. As a consequence, it is not a reliable method of knowledge production. I then open the discussion to ways in which this could be remedied.
The talk assumes no prior knowledge of perspectival realism, infant mindreading (or infants!), and aims to be accessible to all PPN disciplines.
| Period | 10 Mar 2025 |
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| Held at | University of Glasgow, United Kingdom |
| Degree of Recognition | National |