Outside directors are ones who are not employees or stakeholders in the company. Because they have very little conflicts of interest and may see the big picture differently than insiders, outside directors have been regarded as a major component of the internal corporate governance mechanism to monitor the executives and to safeguard the shareholders’ wealth. In the literature, outside directors are mainly studied in terms of their presence (the proportion of the outside directors) and characteristics, including their expertise, tenure, additional directorships, availability and information. These characteristic-based proxies failed to directly reflect the efforts that outside directors made and mixed results are documented in the literature. To address such issue, this project examines to what extend the outside directors engage in their monitoring responsibilities in the board by using the incidence of their dissent opinions expressed in board meetings against CEOs. This project opens a new dimension in the study of outside directors by proposing a new action-based measure of the outside directors, contributes to the literature of corporate governance in general and also adds to the literature of emerging markets.