A direct Kantian duty to animals

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Abstract

Kant's view that we have only indirect duties to animals fails to capture the intuitive notion that wronging animals transgresses duties we owe to those animals. Here I argue that a suitably modified Kantianism can allow for direct duties to animals and, in particular, an imperfect duty to promote animal welfare without unduly compromising its core theoretical commitments, especially its commitments concerning the source and nature of our duties toward rational beings. The basis for such duties is that animal welfare, on my revised Kantian view, is neither a conditioned nor unconditioned good, but a final and nonderivative good that ought to be treated as an end‐in‐itself. However, this duty to promote animal welfare operates according to a broadly consequentialist logic that both accords well with our considered judgments about our duties to animals and explains differences between these duties and duties owed to rational agents.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)338-358
Number of pages21
JournalThe Southern Journal of Philosophy
Volume52
Issue number3
Early online date2 Sept 2014
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2 Sept 2014

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