@techreport{090c97c75dfa464eaf618164d14cf9a0,
title = "A Labor Market with Targeted Wage Offers",
abstract = "We model a market for highly skilled workers, such as the academic job market. The outputs of firm-worker matches are heterogeneous and common knowledge. Wage setting is synchronous with search: firms simultaneously make on personalized offer each to the worker of their choice. With large frictions (delay costs), efficient coordination is not possible, but for small frictions efficient matching with Diamond-type monopsony wages is an equilibrium.",
author = "Jozsef Sakovics",
year = "2011",
month = jun,
day = "21",
language = "English",
series = "ESE Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
number = "207",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
}