A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences

Jozsef Sakovics

A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper

Abstract

In this note I argue that the traditional argument proving the non-existence of two-person ordinal bargaining solutions is misleading, and also provide an example of such a solution.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Original language	English
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
Publication status	Published - 2004

Publication series

Name	ESE Discussion Papers

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bargaining solution
© Sakovics, J. (2004). A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences. (ESE Discussion Papers). Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
Accepted author manuscript, 115 KB

http://ideas.repec.org/p/edn/esedps/98.html

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A Meaningful Two-Person Bargaining Solution Based on Ordinal Preferences

Abstract

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