Abstract
I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and potentially more plausible accounts of these three cases. I reflect on how this mental files approach can be viewed either as a supplement to the orthodox aetiology, or as suggesting an altogether different aetiology. I end by addressing a concern surrounding the explanatory power of mental files.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 389-404 |
Journal | Review of Philosophy and Psychology |
Volume | 7 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 23 Apr 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Jun 2016 |