A Note on Best Response Dynamics

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the relationship between the continuous time best response dynamic, its perturbed version and evolutionary dynamics in relation to mixed strategy equilibria. We find that as the level of noise approaches zero, the perturbed best response dynamic has the same quantitative properties as a broad class of evolutionary dynamics. That is, stability properties of equilibria are robust across learning dynamics of quite different origins and motivations.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)138-150
Number of pages13
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume29
Issue number1-2
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A Note on Best Response Dynamics'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this