A Simple Test of Learning Theory?

Jim Engle-Warnick, Ed Hopkins

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 Ã? 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We ran each game in high and low payoff treatments. We find that, in all treatments, average play is close to equilibrium even though there are strong cycles present in the data.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages43
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2006

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers

Keywords

  • games
  • learning
  • experiments
  • stochastic fictitious play
  • Mixed strategy equilibria;
  • C72
  • C73
  • C92
  • D83

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