Abstract
We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea that the agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomes into a disagreement point. Adding this function to the description of a bargaining problem, a weak axiom based on individual rationality leads to a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a function of the parties' relative power in the disagreement scenario. As a result, we identify a link between the circumstances of bargaining and the bargaining powers within it.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 227-252 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Theory and Decision |
Volume | 65 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2008 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- bargaining
- conflict
- disagreement
- ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
- LAND-REFORM
- PROPERTY
- MODEL