A Trace of Anger is Enough: On the Enforcement of Social Norms

Jakub Steiner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-4
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume8
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2007

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