Absolute Space as a necessary idea: Reading Kant’s Phenomenology through perspectival lenses

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Abstract / Description of output

Kant’s engagement with Newton’s notion of ‘absolute space’ is fascinating, complex, and spans over both the pre-Critical and the Critical period. The received view has it that in the pre-Critical period Kant shifted from an originally Leibnizian view of space (still visible in Physical Monadology [MonPh, 1756], and New Doctrine of Motion and Rest [NLBR, 1758]) to a proper Newtonian view of absolute space via the incongruent counterparts argument in Directions in Space (GUGR, 1768), for then abandoning absolute space in the Inaugural Dissertation (MSI, 1770). Indeed, the same argument from incongruent counterparts was later employed in the Prolegomena (1783) as an argument for space as “the form of outer intuition of … sensibility” (Prol, 4:286).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationKant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
Subtitle of host publicationA Critical Guide
EditorsMichael Bennett McNulty
PublisherCambridge University Press
Chapter10
Pages215-239
ISBN (Electronic)9781108661072
ISBN (Print)9781108476898
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2022

Publication series

NameCambridge Critical Guides

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