An Adversarial Algorithm for Delegation

Juan Afanador*, Murilo Baptista, Nir Oren

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Task delegation lies at the heart of the service economy, and is a fundamental aspect of many agent marketplaces. Research in computational trust considers which agent a task should be delegated to for execution given the agent’s past behaviour. However, such work does not consider the effects of the agent delegating the task onwards, forming a chain of delegations before the task is finally executed (as occurs in many human outsourcing scenarios). In this paper we consider such delegation chains, and empirically demonstrate that existing trust based approaches do not handle these situations as well. We then introduce a new algorithm based on quitting games to cater for recursive delegation.

Original languageEnglish
Pages130-145
Number of pages16
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Apr 2019
Event6th International Conference on Agreement Technologies, AT 2018 - Bergen, Norway
Duration: 6 Dec 20187 Dec 2018

Conference

Conference6th International Conference on Agreement Technologies, AT 2018
Country/TerritoryNorway
CityBergen
Period6/12/187/12/18

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