@techreport{632a551791ec43cab57b16d81198c040,
title = "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game",
abstract = "A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang (2005) on strategic informationtransmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more informationthan predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidencethat this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms ofa tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, weshow in a simple sender-receiver game that subjects incurring in costs topunish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agentquantal response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars afterreceiving a deceptive message play, on the aggregate, equilibrium strategies.Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one groupof subjects with preferences for truth-telling and one taking into accountonly material incentives.",
keywords = "morally consistent behavior, procedural justice, strategic information transmission, truth-telling, C72, C73, D83",
author = "Santiago Sanchez-Pages",
year = "2006",
month = sep,
day = "5",
language = "English",
series = "ESE Discussion Papers",
publisher = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
number = "128",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",
}