Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge—known as anti-luck
virtue epistemology—can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: (i) why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; (ii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of exposing the subject to significant levels of epistemic risk; and (iii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of highlighting how the subject’s safe cognitive success does not stand in the appropriate explanatory relationship to her manifestation of relevant cognitive ability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)3065-3077
Issue number7
Early online date31 Mar 2016
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 31 Mar 2016

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Epistemology
  • Knowledge
  • Epistemic defeaters
  • Anti-luck virtue epistemology


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