Applying the ‘ceased circumstances’ Cessation Clause: More politics than law?

Drawing on a detailed history of the ‘ceased circumstances’ cessation clause that was invoked for Eritrean refugees in 2002, this article highlights why the starting point for any analysis of the application of article 1C(5) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees must focus as much on politics as on law. This is not only because of the impossibility of insulating States and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from the political pressures that surround any determination of ‘ceased circumstances’ in a particular country, but also because the very standards on which such a determination rests are inherently relational, circumstantial, and political. Despite guidelines on the application of the clause promoting an ‘objective and verifiable’ approach, they rest on assessments of a ‘functioning’ government and ‘effective’ protection, of acceptable standards of human rights, and of the ‘best interests’ of refugees, all of which are geographically and historically contingent. The article thus argues that focusing on the legal standards that ostensibly underpin any invocation of article 1C(5) may perpetuate the fallacy that these standards can ever be objectively determined and, in focusing attention on how to better clarify these thresholds and conditions, this approach may, in certain instances, divert attention from confronting the political pressures that govern the application of the clause.