Bankers’ remuneration and political incentives in Chinese state-owned commercial banks: Regulation and practice

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the regulatory tightening of bankers’ remuneration has become an essential part of the reform of banking regulation in global financial markets. With reference to these international principles and standards, China has also launched a regulation-guided reform to promote the modernisation of bankers’ remuneration. This article provides the first empirical analysis of the regulation and practice of bankers’ remuneration and incentives in China’s state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). The empirical evidence shows that the regulation has not been effectively implemented. Instead, the traditional politicised and administrative approach, which prioritises political incentives over market-oriented remuneration, remains predominant.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)451-503
JournalJournal of Corporate Law Studies
Volume19
Issue number2
Early online date4 Dec 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 3 Jul 2019

Keywords

  • bankers’ remuneration
  • political incentives
  • state-owned banks
  • China
  • regulation

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Bankers’ remuneration and political incentives in Chinese state-owned commercial banks: Regulation and practice'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this