Activities per year
In the attempt to understand the norms governing believers, epistemologists have tended to focus on individual belief as the primary object of epistemic evaluation. However, norm governance is often assumed to concern, at base, things we can do as a free exercise or manifestation of our agency. Yet believing is not plausibly conceived as something we freely do but rather as a state we are in, usually as the mostly automatic or involuntary result of cognitively processes shaped by nature, bias, and ideology. In this paper, I sketch a response to this tension. This response is based on rejecting the traditional theoretical focus on an individual’s particular beliefs as the primary object of normative epistemic evaluation. If we shift our focus from the particular beliefs of individuals to the community and its information managing practices, we may lessen the tension between norm governance and automaticity and involuntariness in a way that construes autonomous cognitive agency as a resultant of rather than a precondition for our norm-governed epistemic sociality.
|Title of host publication||The Ethics of Belief and Beyond|
|Subtitle of host publication||Understanding Mental Normativity|
|Editors||Sebastian Schmidt, Gehard Ernst|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Number of pages||22|
|Publication status||Published - 1 Jun 2020|
|Name||Routledge Studies in Epistemology|
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- 1 Public Engagement – Work on advisory panels for social community and cultural engagement
Matthew Chrisman (Advisor)Sep 2020 → Sep 2021
Activity: Consultancy types › Public Engagement – Work on advisory panels for social community and cultural engagement