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Abstract / Description of output
We present a novel micro-structure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether - depending on the other clubs' bids - a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options,we support - and generalize to heterogeneous players - the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial "ownership" and revenue sharing arrangements.We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a non-specific club objective with an endogenously derived trade-off between pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- competitive balance
- competitive foreclosure
- contested workers
- labor auction
- procurement in sport
FingerprintDive into the research topics of 'Bidding for talent in sport'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
- 1 Finished
1/01/16 → 31/12/18
- 1 Discussion paper
Sakovics, J. & Burguet, R., 2018, Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, 41 p.
Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper