Bidding for talent in sport

Roberto Burguet; Jozsef Sakovics

doi:10.1111/ecin.12712

Bidding for talent in sport

Roberto Burguet, Jozsef Sakovics

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We present a novel micro-structure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether - depending on the other clubs' bids - a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options,we support - and generalize to heterogeneous players - the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial "ownership" and revenue sharing arrangements.We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a non-specific club objective with an endogenously derived trade-off between pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	85-102
Journal	Economic Inquiry
Volume	57
Issue number	1
Early online date	17 Sept 2018
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12712
Publication status	Published - 4 Dec 2018

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

competitive balance
competitive foreclosure
contested workers
labor auction
procurement in sport

Access to Document

10.1111/ecin.12712

BurguetSakovicsEI2018BiddingForTalentInSport
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Burguet, R. and Sákovics, J. (2018), BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT. Econ Inq. . doi:10.1111/ecin.12712, which has been published in final form at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1111%2Fecin.12712. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions
Accepted author manuscript, 287 KB

Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms.
Sakovics, J. (Principal Investigator) & Visschers, L. (Co-investigator)
ESRC
1/01/16 → 31/12/18
Project: Research

Bidding for talent in sport
Sakovics, J. & Burguet, R., 2018, Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, 41 p.
Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Cite this

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title = "Bidding for talent in sport",

abstract = "We present a novel micro-structure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether - depending on the other clubs' bids - a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options,we support - and generalize to heterogeneous players - the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial {"}ownership{"} and revenue sharing arrangements.We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a non-specific club objective with an endogenously derived trade-off between pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.",

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doi = "10.1111/ecin.12712",

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AU - Sakovics, Jozsef

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N2 - We present a novel micro-structure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether - depending on the other clubs' bids - a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options,we support - and generalize to heterogeneous players - the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial "ownership" and revenue sharing arrangements.We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a non-specific club objective with an endogenously derived trade-off between pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.

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KW - competitive balance

KW - competitive foreclosure

KW - contested workers

KW - labor auction

KW - procurement in sport

U2 - 10.1111/ecin.12712

DO - 10.1111/ecin.12712

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SP - 85

EP - 102

JO - Economic Inquiry

JF - Economic Inquiry

IS - 1

ER -

Bidding for talent in sport

Abstract

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

Access to Document

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Projects

Transparency in Procurement: The design and use of information in trading mechanisms.

Research output

Bidding for talent in sport

Cite this