Abstract
Payment channel networks (PCNs) mitigate the scalability issues of current decentralized cryptocurrencies. They allow for arbitrarily many payments between users connected through a path of intermediate payment channels, while requiring interacting with the blockchain only to open and close the channels. Unfortunately, PCNs are (i) tailored to payments, excluding more complex smart contract functionalities, such as the oracle-enabling Discreet Log Contracts and (ii) their need for active participation from intermediaries may make payments unreliable, slower, expensive, and privacy-invasive. Virtual channels are among the most promising techniques to mitigate these issues, allowing two endpoints of a path to create a direct channel over the intermediaries without any interaction with the blockchain. After such a virtual channel is constructed, (i) the endpoints can use this direct channel for applications other than payments and (ii) the intermediaries are no longer involved in updates. In this work, we first introduce the Domino attack, a new DoS/griefing style attack that leverages virtual channels to destruct the PCN itself and is inherent to the design adopted by the existing Bitcoin-compatible virtual channels. We then demonstrate its severity by a quantitative analysis on a snapshot of the Lightning Network (LN), the most widely deployed PCN at present. We finally discuss other serious drawbacks of existing virtual channel designs, such as the support for only a single intermediary, a latency and blockchain overhead linear in the path length, or a non-constant storage overhead per user. We then present Donner, the first virtual channel construction that overcomes the shortcomings above, by relying on a novel design paradigm. We formally define and prove security and privacy properties in the Universal Composability framework. Our evaluation shows that Donner is efficient, reduces the on-chain number of transactions for disputes from linear in the path length to a single one, which is the key to prevent Domino attacks, and reduces the storage overhead from logarithmic in the path length to constant. Donner is Bitcoin-compatible and can be easily integrated in the LN.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium |
| Publisher | The Internet Society |
| Pages | 1-18 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 1891562835 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 3 Mar 2023 |
| Event | 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium - San Diego, United States Duration: 27 Feb 2023 → 3 Mar 2023 Conference number: 30 https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2023/ |
Symposium
| Symposium | 2023 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium |
|---|---|
| Abbreviated title | NDSS 2023 |
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | San Diego |
| Period | 27/02/23 → 3/03/23 |
| Internet address |
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