Brexit and the mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts in the context of devolution: Do we need a new model?

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract / Description of output

The referendum vote in 2016 to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the process for its implementation have had a significant impact on the devolution framework, and in particular on its legal mechanisms for ensuring harmonious relations between Westminster and the devolved legislatures, and for resolving conflicts between them. Focusing on the Miller and Scottish Continuity Bill cases, this chapter highlights the problems arising from the use of the mechanisms established in the devolution settlements, primarily designed to ensure that the devolved legislatures do not act ultra vires, for the legal resolution of competence conflicts between both orders of government. Taking into consideration the significant role that the courts play in federal or quasi-federal systems by providing an independent and balanced interpretation of the constitutional framework, this chapter reflects on the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the UK system and argues that, in the light of recent developments, they need to be reformed to enable the access of the devolved institutions to the courts in this context.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Brexit Challenge for Ireland and the United Kingdom
Subtitle of host publicationConstitutions under Pressure
EditorsOran Doyle, Aileen McHarg, Jo Murkens
PublisherCambridge University Press
Chapter2
Pages43-63
Number of pages21
ISBN (Electronic)9781108966399
ISBN (Print)9781108832922
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Aug 2021

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • devolution
  • Brexit
  • Sewel Convention
  • Supreme Court
  • devolution issues
  • federalism

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