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Abstract / Description of output
This chapter discusses the question of whether there could ever be artificial intelligence with free will. This question reduces to whether or not artificial intelligence will ever be able to act on domain-general rationally formed intentions. However, it might not be possible to distinguish between behavior that is produced by such intentions and behavior that is merely a simulation. This could be because, as the Chinese Room thought experiment seems to show, consciousness intuitively is a necessary condition for intentionality. There are three potential responses to this challenge. One could argue that full domain-general rational behavior is possible only with consciousness, or that it might also be necessary for the system to be implemented in the right substrate, or that the right microfunctionalist structure needs to be in place for real intentionality.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Free Will |
| Subtitle of host publication | Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation |
| Editors | Uri Maoz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 11 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780197572160, 9780197572153 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 19 Apr 2022 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- artificial intelligence
- simulation
- microfunctionalism
- domain-general
- intensions
- Chinese Room
- consciousness
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Dive into the research topics of 'Can a robot with artificial intelligence have free will?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Research output
- 1 Chapter (peer-reviewed)
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Does free will come in degrees?
Hall, J. & Vierkant, T., 19 Apr 2022, Free Will: Philosophers and Neuroscientists in Conversation. Maoz, U. & Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (eds.). Oxford University PressResearch output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter (peer-reviewed) › peer-review