Abstract / Description of output
This article examines how decision-making dynamics in coalition cabinets influence states’ responses to international norms and foreign policy change. International normative structures may be interpreted differently by coalition partners, which share the authority for responding to external expectations and pressures. I examine two cases of internal contestation over international norms—Japanese decision-making over the ban of imported rice in response to international norms of trade liberalization (1993) and Turkish decision-making over the ban of the death penalty in response to international norms on human rights (1999–2002). In both cases, coalition partners disagreed over policy responses to the norm and I unpack the way in which the norm became entangled in internal coalition politics. The cases are examples of (eventual) policy change, which challenges a dominant image of coalitions completely deadlocked actors. The explanations of these case outcomes further our understanding of how domestic agents and structures respond to international norms and produce changes in foreign policies.
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- coalition cabinets
- foreign policy change
- international norms