Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case

Vijay Krishna

Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case

Vijay Krishna

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Abstract

We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.

Original language	English
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages	19
Publication status	Published - Sept 2004

Publication series

Name	ESE Discussion Papers
No.	125

Access to Document

comm1
© Krishna, V. (2004). Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case . (ESE Discussion Papers; No. 125). Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
Final published version, 162 KB

http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/id125_esedps.pdf

Cite this

@techreport{53dab6529fa1430e9c486e0499f2d819,

title = "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case",

abstract = "We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.",

author = "Vijay Krishna",

year = "2004",

month = sep,

language = "English",

series = "ESE Discussion Papers",

publisher = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",

number = "125",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series",

}

TY - UNPB

T1 - Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case

AU - Krishna, Vijay

PY - 2004/9

Y1 - 2004/9

N2 - We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.

AB - We study the effect of communication in two-person games of incomplete information. We show that any rational mediated communication mechanism satisfying a Nash domination condition can be implemented as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a communication extension of the original game and ends in finite time with probability 1.

M3 - Discussion paper

T3 - ESE Discussion Papers

BT - Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case

PB - Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series

ER -

Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case

Abstract

Publication series

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this