Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds

Michele Ciampi; Rafail Ostrovsky; Luisa Siniscalchi; Ivan Visconti

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10

Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds

Michele Ciampi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Luisa Siniscalchi, Ivan Visconti

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal et al. [22] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [41]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intriguing problem of constructing 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes.

In this paper we solve the above open problem by showing how to transform any 3-round (one-left one-right) non-malleable commitment scheme (with some extractability property) in a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. Our transform makes use of complexity leveraging and when instantiated with the construction of [22] gives a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme from one-way permutations secure w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries.

We also show a 3-round arguments of knowledge and a 3-round identification scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2016
Editors	Matthew Robshaw, Jonathan Katz
Place of Publication	Berlin, Heidelberg
Publisher	Springer
Pages	270-299
Number of pages	30
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-662-53015-3
ISBN (Print)	978-3-662-53014-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10
Publication status	Published - 21 Jul 2016
Event	36th Annual International Cryptology Conference - University of California, Santa Barbara, United States Duration: 14 Aug 2016 → 18 Aug 2016 https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/ https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/index.html

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publisher	Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Volume	9816
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	36th Annual International Cryptology Conference
Abbreviated title	CRYPTO 2016
Country/Territory	United States
City	Santa Barbara
Period	14/08/16 → 18/08/16
Internet address	https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/ https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/index.html

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10

Concurrent Non-Malleable CommitmentsAccepted author manuscript, 552 KB

https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-662-53015-3_10

Cite this

@inproceedings{622db47a1ef7490089b23fb3c72f7c67,

title = "Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds",

abstract = "The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal et al. [22] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [41]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intriguing problem of constructing 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes.In this paper we solve the above open problem by showing how to transform any 3-round (one-left one-right) non-malleable commitment scheme (with some extractability property) in a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. Our transform makes use of complexity leveraging and when instantiated with the construction of [22] gives a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme from one-way permutations secure w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries.We also show a 3-round arguments of knowledge and a 3-round identification scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.",

author = "Michele Ciampi and Rafail Ostrovsky and Luisa Siniscalchi and Ivan Visconti",

year = "2016",

month = jul,

day = "21",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10",

language = "English",

isbn = "978-3-662-53014-6",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer",

pages = "270--299",

editor = "Matthew Robshaw and Jonathan Katz",

booktitle = "Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2016",

address = "United Kingdom",

note = "36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, CRYPTO 2016 ; Conference date: 14-08-2016 Through 18-08-2016",

url = "https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/, https://www.iacr.org/conferences/crypto2016/index.html",

}

Ciampi, M, Ostrovsky, R, Siniscalchi, L & Visconti, I 2016, Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds. in M Robshaw & J Katz (eds), Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9816, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 270-299, 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, United States, 14/08/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10

Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds. / Ciampi, Michele; Ostrovsky, Rafail; Siniscalchi, Luisa et al.
Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2016. ed. / Matthew Robshaw; Jonathan Katz. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2016. p. 270-299 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science; Vol. 9816).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

TY - GEN

T1 - Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds

AU - Ciampi, Michele

AU - Ostrovsky, Rafail

AU - Siniscalchi, Luisa

AU - Visconti, Ivan

PY - 2016/7/21

Y1 - 2016/7/21

N2 - The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal et al. [22] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [41]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intriguing problem of constructing 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes.In this paper we solve the above open problem by showing how to transform any 3-round (one-left one-right) non-malleable commitment scheme (with some extractability property) in a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. Our transform makes use of complexity leveraging and when instantiated with the construction of [22] gives a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme from one-way permutations secure w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries.We also show a 3-round arguments of knowledge and a 3-round identification scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.

AB - The round complexity of commitment schemes secure against man-in-the-middle attacks has been the focus of extensive research for about 25 years. The recent breakthrough of Goyal et al. [22] showed that 3 rounds are sufficient for (one-left, one-right) non-malleable commitments. This result matches a lower bound of [41]. The state of affairs leaves still open the intriguing problem of constructing 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes.In this paper we solve the above open problem by showing how to transform any 3-round (one-left one-right) non-malleable commitment scheme (with some extractability property) in a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme. Our transform makes use of complexity leveraging and when instantiated with the construction of [22] gives a 3-round concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme from one-way permutations secure w.r.t. subexponential-time adversaries.We also show a 3-round arguments of knowledge and a 3-round identification scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attacks.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10

DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-53015-3_10

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 978-3-662-53014-6

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 270

EP - 299

BT - Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2016

A2 - Robshaw, Matthew

A2 - Katz, Jonathan

PB - Springer

CY - Berlin, Heidelberg

T2 - 36th Annual International Cryptology Conference

Y2 - 14 August 2016 through 18 August 2016

ER -

Concurrent Non-Malleable Commitments (and More) in 3 Rounds

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Access to Document

Fingerprint

Cite this