Contagion through Learning

Jakub Steiner; Colin Stewart

Contagion through Learning

Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart

School of Economics

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper

Abstract / Description of output

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games.
Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.

Original language	English
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages	35
Publication status	Published - 9 Aug 2007

Publication series

Name	ESE Discussion Papers
No.	151

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

similarity
learning
contagion
case-based reasoning
global games
coordination
subjective priors

Access to Document

learning070809
© Steiner, J., & Stewart, C. (2007). Contagion through Learning. (ESE Discussion Papers; No. 151). Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series.
Final published version, 278 KB

http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/learning070809.pdf

1 Article

Contagion through learning
Steiner, J. & Stewart, C., Dec 2008, In: Theoretical Economics. 3, 4, p. 431-458
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Open Access
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Cite this

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Contagion through Learning

Abstract / Description of output

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Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

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Research output

Contagion through learning

Cite this