Coordination of Mobile Labor

Jakub Steiner

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Abstract

We study coordination failures in many simultaneously occurring coordination problems. Players encounter one of the problems but have the outside option of migrating to one of the remaining ones. Drawing on the global games approach, we show that such a mobile game has a unique equilibrium that allows us to examine comparative statics. The endogeneity of the outside option value and of the migration activity leads to non-monotonicity of welfare with respect to mobility friction; high mobility may hurt players. We apply these “general equilibrium” findings to the problem of the labor market during industrialization as described by Matsuyama [11].
Original languageEnglish
PublisherEdinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 11 Dec 2006

Publication series

NameESE Discussion Papers
No.152

Keywords

  • coordination
  • general equilibrium
  • global games
  • globalization
  • industrialization
  • mobility
  • C72
  • D82
  • D83

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  • Coordination of mobile labor

    Steiner, J., Mar 2008, In: Journal of Economic Theory. 139, 1, p. 25-46

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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