Abstract
Settling a legal dispute involves some costs that the parties have to in curex-ante, for the pretrial negotiation and possible agreement to become feasible. Even in a full information world, if the distribution of these costs is sufficiently mismatched with the distribution of the parties' bargaining powers, a pretrial agreement may never be reached even though actual Court litigation is overall wasteful.Our results shed light on two key issues. First, a Plaintiff may initiate a law suit even though the parties fully anticipate that it will be settled out of Court. Second,the "likelihood" that a given law suit goes to trial is unaffected by how trial costs are distributed among the litigants. The choice of fee-shifting rule can only affect whether the Plaintiff files a law suit in the first place. It does not affect whether it is settled before trial or litigated in Court.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 159–188 |
Journal | The Journal of Legal Studies (JLS) |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 31 Jan 2019 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- pretrial agreements
- costly negotiations
- court litigation