Abstract
In emerging mobile networks, control and user plane separation (CUPS) plays a critical role in scaling the control plane and user-plane functions independently and enables network virtualization through network slicing. However, a CUPS hijacking attack on a mobile network slicing system and the resulting network performance degradation is yet to be studied.
In this work, we investigate the consequences of CUPS hijacking of a radio access network (RAN) slicing system on the overall network performances. We quantify the impacts of CUPS hijacking by designing an Impact Factor metric I, prototype a real-world RAN slicing use case on an end-to-end mobile network test-bed, and systematically analyze the empirical results to reveal the impacts of CUPS hijacking on the network performance. We show a successful CUPS hijacking by a rogue slice owner in a RAN slicing system increases the RAN slice control-plane signalling delay above 2ms, the operational upper-bound of our system, to disrupt the control plane operations by injecting low rate DoS (LDoS) traffic in user-plane. The naive hijacking can degrade throughput performances of the rogue slice as well as a co-located victim slice down to 0 Mbps. We further show that a carefully crafted user-plane traffic by the attacker can regain ∼92% of its original user-plane packet delivery success rate while other slices are under the denial of service.
In this work, we investigate the consequences of CUPS hijacking of a radio access network (RAN) slicing system on the overall network performances. We quantify the impacts of CUPS hijacking by designing an Impact Factor metric I, prototype a real-world RAN slicing use case on an end-to-end mobile network test-bed, and systematically analyze the empirical results to reveal the impacts of CUPS hijacking on the network performance. We show a successful CUPS hijacking by a rogue slice owner in a RAN slicing system increases the RAN slice control-plane signalling delay above 2ms, the operational upper-bound of our system, to disrupt the control plane operations by injecting low rate DoS (LDoS) traffic in user-plane. The naive hijacking can degrade throughput performances of the rogue slice as well as a co-located victim slice down to 0 Mbps. We further show that a carefully crafted user-plane traffic by the attacker can regain ∼92% of its original user-plane packet delivery success rate while other slices are under the denial of service.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | 2021 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security |
Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
Pages | 38-46 |
Number of pages | 9 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 978-1-6654-4496-5 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-1-6654-4497-2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 10 Feb 2022 |
Event | 2021 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security - Virtual Conference Duration: 4 Oct 2021 → 6 Oct 2021 https://cns2021.ieee-cns.org/ |
Conference
Conference | 2021 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security |
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Abbreviated title | CNS 2021 |
Period | 4/10/21 → 6/10/21 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- 5G security
- secure slicing
- RAN slicing
- CUPS hijacking
- DoS