Definitions and Security of Quantum Electronic Voting

Myrto Arapinis, Nikolaos Lamprou, Elham Kashefi, Anna Pappa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Recent advances indicate that quantum computers will soon be reality. Motivated by this ever more realistic threat for existing classical cryptographic protocols, researchers have developed several schemes to resist “quantum attacks.” In particular, for electronic voting (e-voting), several schemes relying on properties of quantum mechanics have been proposed. However, each of these proposals comes with a different and often not well-articulated corruption model, has different objectives, and is accompanied by security claims that are never formalized and are at best justified only against specific attacks. To address this, we propose the first formal security definitions for quantum e-voting protocols. With these at hand, we systematize and evaluate the security of previously proposed quantum e-voting protocols; we examine the claims of these works concerning privacy, correctness, and verifiability, and if they are correctly attributed to the proposed protocols. In all non-trivial cases, we identify specific quantum attacks that violate these properties. We argue that the cause of these failures lies in the absence of formal security models and references to the existing cryptographic literature.
Original languageEnglish
Article number4
Number of pages33
JournalACM Transactions on Quantum Computing
Volume2
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 14 Apr 2021

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