Abstract
According to the Desiderative Lockean Thesis, there are necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in the terms of decision theory, for when one is truly said to want. I advance a new Desiderative Lockean view. My view is distinctive in being doubly context-sensitive. Want ascriptions exhibit a remarkable context-sensitivity: what a person is truly said to want varies by context in a variety of ways, a fact that has not been fully appreciated. Others Desiderative Lockeans attempt to capture the context-sensitivity in want ascriptions by positing a single context-sensitive parameter. I posit two. Only with a doubly context-sensitive view can we explain a range of facts that go unexplained by all other Desiderative Lockean views.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Publication status | Accepted/In press - 27 Nov 2023 |
Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)
- desire ascriptions
- desire
- attitude ascriptions
- decision theory
- context-sensitivity
- Lockean Thesis