Designing decentralized markets for distribution system flexibility

Thomas Morstyn, Alexander Teytelboym, Malcom D. McCulloch

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper introduces a decentralized market design, which allows a distribution system operator to manage local demand constraints by obtaining flexibility from competing aggregators, which must in-turn incentivize prosumers to provide this flexibility. The novel networked market structure accounts for distribution system operator-to-aggregator and aggregator-to-prosumer ICT infrastructure and contractual arrangements, which may limit which participants can negotiate transactions with one another. The proposed flexibility market is opt-in for prosumers, which continue to obtain energy within the existing retail electricity market. At the same time, it is underpinned by bilateral energy transactions, and could be integrated into future peer-to-peer electricity markets. Through the market, the distribution system operator, aggregators, and prosumers reach agreement on a stable outcome-a set of individually beneficial transactions no group wishes to mutually deviate from. Market outcomes also satisfy Pareto efficiency, meaning that it is not possible to make a participant better off, without making another worse off.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2128 - 2139
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Power Systems
Volume34
Issue number3
Early online date11 Dec 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 31 May 2019

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