Abstract
I investigate the implication of the truth-‐‑relativist’s alleged ‘faultless disagreements for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of
disagreement the truth-‐‑relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-‐‑epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-‐‑relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-‐‑relativist has actually preserved.
disagreement the truth-‐‑relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-‐‑epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-‐‑relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-‐‑relativist has actually preserved.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 155-172 |
| Journal | Erkenntnis |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2014 |
Keywords
- relativism
- Disagreement