Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision

J. Adam Carter

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


I investigate the implication of the truth-­‐‑relativist’s alleged ‘faultless disagreements for issues in the epistemology of disagreement. A conclusion I draw is that the type of
disagreement the truth-­‐‑relativist claims (as a key advantage over the contextualist) to preserve fails in principle to be epistemically significant in the way we should expect disagreements to be in social-­‐‑epistemic practice. In particular, the fact of faultless disagreement fails to ever play the epistemically significant role of making doxastic revision (at least sometimes) rationally required for either party in a (faultless) disagreement. That the truth-­‐‑relativists’ disagreements over centred content fail to play this epistemically significant role that disagreements characteristically play in social epistemology should leave us sceptical that disagreement is what the truth-­‐‑relativist has actually preserved.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)155-172
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2014


  • relativism
  • Disagreement


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