Dispelling Myths on Superposition Attacks: Formal Security Model and Attack Analyses

Luka Music, Céline Chevalier, Elham Kashefi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

With the emergence of quantum communication, it is of folkloric belief that the security of classical cryptographic protocols is automatically broken if the Adversary is allowed to perform superposition queries and the honest players forced to perform actions coherently on quantum states. Another widely held intuition is that enforcing measurements on the exchanged messages is enough to protect protocols from these attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProvable and Practical Security
EditorsKhoa Nguyen, Wenling Wu, Kwok Yan Lam, Huaxiong Wang
Place of PublicationCham
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages318-337
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-030-62576-4
ISBN (Print)978-3-030-62576-4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 20 Nov 2020
Event14th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security - Online, Singapore
Duration: 29 Nov 20201 Dec 2020
https://www.ntu.edu.sg/scripts/news-events/provsec/provsec-2020

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
Volume12505
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference14th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security
Abbreviated titleProvSec 2020
Country/TerritorySingapore
Period29/11/201/12/20
Internet address

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • Cryptographic protocols
  • Superposition attack
  • Post quantum security
  • Security model
  • Yao’s protocol

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