Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

Nikos Chondros*, Bingsheng Zhang, Thomas Zacharias, Panos Diamantopoulos, Stathis Maneas, Christos Patsonakis, Alex Delis, Aggelos Kiayias, Mema Roussopoulos

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)268-299
Number of pages32
JournalComputers and Security
Early online date6 Mar 2019
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2019

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • E-voting systems
  • Internet voting
  • End-to-end verifiability
  • Distributed systems
  • Byzantine Fault tolerance


Dive into the research topics of 'Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this