Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

Nikos Chondros; Bingsheng Zhang; Thomas Zacharias; Panos Diamantopoulos; Stathis Maneas; Christos Patsonakis; Alex Delis; Aggelos Kiayias; Mema Roussopoulos

doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001

Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

Nikos Chondros^*, Bingsheng Zhang, Thomas Zacharias, Panos Diamantopoulos, Stathis Maneas, Christos Patsonakis, Alex Delis, Aggelos Kiayias, Mema Roussopoulos

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract / Description of output

We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	268-299
Number of pages	32
Journal	Computers and Security
Volume	83
Early online date	6 Mar 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001
Publication status	Published - 1 Jun 2019

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

E-voting systems
Internet voting
End-to-end verifiability
Distributed systems
Byzantine Fault tolerance
SECURE

Access to Document

10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001Licence: All Rights Reserved

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404818310290Licence: All Rights Reserved

Cite this

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title = "Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems",

abstract = "We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "E-voting systems, Internet voting, End-to-end verifiability, Distributed systems, Byzantine Fault tolerance, SECURE",

author = "Nikos Chondros and Bingsheng Zhang and Thomas Zacharias and Panos Diamantopoulos and Stathis Maneas and Christos Patsonakis and Alex Delis and Aggelos Kiayias and Mema Roussopoulos",

year = "2019",

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doi = "10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001",

language = "English",

volume = "83",

pages = "268--299",

journal = "Computers and Security",

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T1 - Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

AU - Chondros, Nikos

AU - Zhang, Bingsheng

AU - Zacharias, Thomas

AU - Diamantopoulos, Panos

AU - Maneas, Stathis

AU - Patsonakis, Christos

AU - Delis, Alex

AU - Kiayias, Aggelos

AU - Roussopoulos, Mema

PY - 2019/6/1

Y1 - 2019/6/1

N2 - We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

AB - We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions. Crown Copyright (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

KW - E-voting systems

KW - Internet voting

KW - End-to-end verifiability

KW - Distributed systems

KW - Byzantine Fault tolerance

KW - SECURE

U2 - 10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001

DO - 10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001

M3 - Article

SN - 0167-4048

VL - 83

SP - 268

EP - 299

JO - Computers and Security

JF - Computers and Security

ER -

Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

Abstract / Description of output

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

Access to Document

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