Abstract
Although the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers (CRMW) is a ‘core’ human rights treaty, it is poorly ratified. Previous studies have elucidated the barriers to ratification; in this article we focus on the factors that generate incentives to ratify. We argue that states that ratify this treaty desire to strengthen their relationships with their own emigrants and their citizens at home who advocate for emigrant protections, not to protect the rights of immigrants residing in their own country. The political incentives to strengthen this relationship depend on the costs and benefits that inward migration and outward migration bring to the state. The benefits of emigration are captured by the size of remittance flows, the net immigration position of the country, and by the ratio of unskilled to skilled emigrants, whereas the costs are reflected in the size of the immigrant stock. When the benefits of migration are substantial and the costs of potentially providing rights are small, states will be more likely to ratify this agreement. These determinants are distinctive from the explanations proffered for other human rights treaties. Our statistical analysis is consistent with the theoretical arguments that we make.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 1276-1299 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | The International Journal of Human Rights |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 8 |
Early online date | 29 Apr 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- human rights
- migrant rights
- treaty ramification