Ed Hopkins discusses Understanding Cyclical Behaviour in Strategic Situations

Ed Hopkins

Ed Hopkins discusses Understanding Cyclical Behaviour in Strategic Situations

School of Economics

Research output: Other contribution

Abstract

Results in learning theory show that in many games adaptive learning converges to Nash equilibrium, the type of equilibrium most commonly used in studying strategic situations. However, there is a dark side, rarely acknowledged, to the theory. In some other games learning never converges but rather continues to cycle.

Original language	English
Type	Focus Paper Series
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics Focus Paper Series
Number of pages	2
Publication status	Published - 2014

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Name	Focus Paper Series
Publisher	Edinburgh School of Economics
No.	12

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© Hopkins, E. Ed Hopkins discusses Understanding Cyclical Behaviour in Strategic Situations
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Ed Hopkins discusses Understanding Cyclical Behaviour in Strategic Situations

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