Effects of Belief and Memory on Strategic Negotiation

Markus Guhe, Alex Lascarides, Verena Rieser, O'Connor Kevin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract / Description of output

We present an empirical framework for testing negotiation strategies in a complex win–lose game that lacks any analytic solution. We explore how different belief and memory models affect trading and win rates.We show that cognitive limitations can be compensated for by being an ‘optimistic’ negotiator: make your desired trade offer, regardless of your beliefs about how opponents will react. In contrast, agents with good cognitive abilities can win with fewer but more effective offers. Corpus analysis shows human negotiators are somewhere in between, suggesting that they compensate for deficient memory and belief when necessary.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 17th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue (DialDam)
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 2013

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