Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge

Aristotelis Boukouras, K Koufopoulos

Research output: Working paper

Abstract / Description of output

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the realized frequency of types in the population (the exact number of agents for each type) is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which is consistent with truthful revelation of private information and which implements first-best allocations of resources as the unique equilibrium. The result requires weak restrictions on preferences (Local Non-Common Indifference Property) and on the Pareto correspondence (Anonymity) and it is robust to small noise regarding the realized frequency.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Efficient Allocations in Economies with Asymmetric Information when the Realized Frequency of Types is Common Knowledge'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this