Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms: (Extended Abstract)

Haris Aziz, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Jiashu Chen, Simon Mackenzie, Nicholas Mattei

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We define and give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value (OEV) and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value. Finally, we conduct detailed experiments analyzing the tradeoffs between efficiency with envy-freeness or truthfulness using two prominent random assignment mechanisms --- random serial dictatorship and the probabilistic serial mechanism --- for different classes of utility functions and distributions.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems
Place of PublicationRichland, SC
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Pages1267–1268
Number of pages2
ISBN (Print)9781450342391
Publication statusPublished - 9 May 2016
EventAutonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems International Conference - , Singapore
Duration: 9 May 201613 May 2016
https://sis.smu.edu.sg/aamas2016?itemid=671

Publication series

NameAAMAS '16
PublisherInternational Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Conference

ConferenceAutonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems International Conference
Abbreviated titleAAMAS 2016
Country/TerritorySingapore
Period9/05/1613/05/16
Internet address

Keywords

  • algorithms
  • game theory
  • social choice
  • economics

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