Eliciting information from a committee

Andriy Zapechelnyuk*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2049-2067
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number5
Early online date24 Apr 2013
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2013


  • axiomatic bargaining
  • closed rule
  • collusion
  • communication
  • experts
  • multidimensional mechanism design


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