Eliciting information from a committee

Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008

Eliciting information from a committee

Andriy Zapechelnyuk^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	2049-2067
Number of pages	19
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	5
Early online date	24 Apr 2013
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008
Publication status	Published - Sep 2013

Keywords

axiomatic bargaining
closed rule
collusion
communication
experts
multidimensional mechanism design

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10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008

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title = "Eliciting information from a committee",

abstract = "The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.",

keywords = "axiomatic bargaining, closed rule, collusion, communication, experts, multidimensional mechanism design",

author = "Andriy Zapechelnyuk",

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KW - closed rule

KW - collusion

KW - communication

KW - experts

KW - multidimensional mechanism design

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Eliciting information from a committee

Abstract

Keywords

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