Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Book/ReportBook

Abstract / Description of output

This book offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. The book argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. The book then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, the book offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rational evaluation and demonstrates how this provides an elegant solution to one aspect of the skeptical problem. The book also revisits the epistemological disjunctivist proposal and shows how it can effectively handle the other aspect of the problem. Finally, the book argues that these two anti-skeptical positions, while superficially in tension with each other, are not only compatible but also mutually supporting. The result is a comprehensive and distinctive resolution to the problem of radical skepticism, one that challenges many assumptions in contemporary epistemology.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationPrinceton
PublisherPrinceton University Press
Number of pages239
ISBN (Electronic)9781400873913
ISBN (Print)9780691167237
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

Publication series

NameSoochow University lectures in philosophy
PublisherPrinceton University Press

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • radical skepticism
  • rational evaluation
  • contemporary epistemology
  • world
  • knowledge
  • epistemological disjunctivism

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  • Epistemic Angst

    Duncan Pritchard (Speaker)

    1 Sept 20168 Dec 2016

    Activity: Academic talk or presentation typesInvited talk

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