Epistemic loops and measurement realism

Alistair M. C. Isaac

doi:10.1086/705476

Epistemic loops and measurement realism

Alistair M. C. Isaac

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent philosophy of measurement has emphasized the existence of both diachronic and synchronic “loops,” or feedback processes, in the epistemic achievements of measurement. A widespread response has been to conclude that measurement outcomes do not convey interest-independent facts about the world, and that only a coherentist epistemology of measurement is viable. In contrast, I argue that a form of measurement realism is consistent with these results. The insight is that antecedent structure in measuring spaces constrains our empirical procedures such that successful measurement conveys a limited, but veridical knowledge of “fixed points,” or stable, interest- independent features of the world.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	930-941
Journal	Philosophy of Science
Volume	86
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/705476
Publication status	Published - 1 Dec 2019
Event	Philosophy of Science Association: 26th Biennial Meeting - Seattle, WA, Seattle, United States Duration: 1 Nov 2018 → 4 Nov 2018 https://psa2018.philsci.org/en/

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10.1086/705476

IsaacPS2018EpistemicLoopsAndMeasurementRealism
This is the accepted version of the following article: Epistemic Loops and Measurement Realism Alistair M. C. Isaac Philosophy of Science 2019 86:5, 930-941, which has been published in final form at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/705476.
Accepted author manuscript, 134 KB

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title = "Epistemic loops and measurement realism",

abstract = "Recent philosophy of measurement has emphasized the existence of both diachronic and synchronic “loops,” or feedback processes, in the epistemic achievements of measurement. A widespread response has been to conclude that measurement outcomes do not convey interest-independent facts about the world, and that only a coherentist epistemology of measurement is viable. In contrast, I argue that a form of measurement realism is consistent with these results. The insight is that antecedent structure in measuring spaces constrains our empirical procedures such that successful measurement conveys a limited, but veridical knowledge of “fixed points,” or stable, interest- independent features of the world.",

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AB - Recent philosophy of measurement has emphasized the existence of both diachronic and synchronic “loops,” or feedback processes, in the epistemic achievements of measurement. A widespread response has been to conclude that measurement outcomes do not convey interest-independent facts about the world, and that only a coherentist epistemology of measurement is viable. In contrast, I argue that a form of measurement realism is consistent with these results. The insight is that antecedent structure in measuring spaces constrains our empirical procedures such that successful measurement conveys a limited, but veridical knowledge of “fixed points,” or stable, interest- independent features of the world.

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M3 - Article

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IS - 5

T2 - Philosophy of Science Association: 26th Biennial Meeting

Y2 - 1 November 2018 through 4 November 2018

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Epistemic loops and measurement realism

Abstract

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