Epistemic norms, closure, and No-Belief hinge epistemology

Mona Simion, Johanna Schnurr, Emma Gordon

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

Recent views in hinge epistemology rely on doxastic normativism to argue that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are not beliefs. This paper has two aims; the first is positive: it discusses the general normative credentials of this move. The second is negative: it delivers two negative results for No-Belief hinge epistemology such construed. The first concerns the motivation for the view: if we’re right, doxastic normativism offers little in the way of theoretical support for the claim that our attitudes towards hinge propositions are anything but garden-variety beliefs. The second concerns theoretical fruitfulness: we show that embracing a No-Belief view will either get us in serious theoretical trouble, or loose all anti-sceptical appeal.
Original languageEnglish
JournalSynthese
Early online date2 Mar 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2 Mar 2019

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • hinge epistemology
  • closure
  • epistemic norms
  • scepticism

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