Epistemic rights violations and epistemic injustice

Aidan McGlynn*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

I offer a detailed discussion of the connections Lani Watson posits in her book The Right to Know between violations of a person’s epistemic rights on the one hand and the distinctively epistemic forms of injustice influentially discussed in the work of Miranda Fricker on the other. I argue that if we specify the content of the relevant epistemic rights (and the corresponding duties of others) carefully enough, it becomes plausible that there is an even tighter relationship between violations of these rights and various epistemic injustices than Watson claims. I close by tabling a speculative suggestion on the significance of this conclusion.
Original languageEnglish
Article number29
JournalAsian Journal of Philosophy
Early online date13 Jun 2023
Publication statusPublished - 2023

Keywords / Materials (for Non-textual outputs)

  • epistemic duties
  • epistemic injustice
  • epistemic rights
  • hermeneutical injustice
  • rights violations
  • testimonial injustice


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