Es are good: Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended

Dave Ward, Margarita Stapleton

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)peer-review


We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationConsciousness in Interaction
Subtitle of host publicationThe Role of the Natural and Social Environment in Shaping Consciousness
EditorsFabio Paglieri
PublisherJohn Benjamins
Number of pages22
ISBN (Electronic)9789027274632
ISBN (Print)9789027213525
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameAdvances in Consciousness Research


  • enactivism
  • embodied cognition
  • situated cognition
  • affective cognition


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