Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract / Description of output

The Principle of Indifference (POI) was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called problem of multiple of partitions. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what underlies the problem of multiple partitions is a fundamental tension between POI and the very idea of evidential incomparability.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)605-616
Number of pages11
Issue number3
Early online date21 Sept 2014
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2015


Dive into the research topics of 'Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this