Executive pensions and the pay-performance relation. Evidence from changes to pension legislation in the UK

Brian Main, Ian Gregory-Smith, Peter Wright, Alberto Montagnolix, Damon Morris

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

Abstract

This paper evaluates the role of executive pensions in the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. As a natural experiment, we exploit a major change to the tax-free allowances governing executive pensions. This reform affected the cost of pensions for firms whose executives had accumulated pension benefits in excess of the prescribed limit. We find a strong reaction to the reform. After 6th April 2006, executives saw their defined benefit pension schemes replaced with risk-free cash payments. This imposition of an exogenous constraint on the contracting over CEO pay significantly decreased the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages28
Publication statusPublished - 2017
EventSimposio de la Asociacion Espanola de Economia (SAEe) - Barcelona, Spain
Duration: 14 Dec 201716 Dec 2017
http://www.asesec.org/simposio/

Conference

ConferenceSimposio de la Asociacion Espanola de Economia (SAEe)
Abbreviated titleSAEe
CountrySpain
CityBarcelona
Period14/12/1716/12/17
Internet address

Keywords

  • executive compensation
  • executive pensions
  • pay for performance
  • A-day

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