Experimental Implementation of Non-Gaussian Attacks on a Continuous-Variable Quantum-Key-Distribution System

Jérôme Lodewyck, Thierry Debuisschert, Raul Garcia-Patron Sanchez, Rosa Tualle-Brouri, Nicolas J. Cerf, Philippe Grangier

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the channel parameters. In general, such attacks add excess noise in the channel, and may also result in non-Gaussian output distributions. We implement and characterize the measurements needed to detect these attacks, and evaluate experimentally the information rates available to the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The results are consistent with the optimality of Gaussian attacks resulting from the security proofs.
Original languageEnglish
Article number030503
Number of pages4
JournalPhysical Review Letters
Volume98
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 19 Jan 2007

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